The practical realization of European Union (EU) 
Introduction
This chapter aims to add to the discussion of new governance mechanisms to address and solve problems of misapplication of EU law. It draws on theory on transgovernmental networks from international relations studies and applies these to examine the practical application of, and compliance with, EU law.
Compliance with international agreements continues to be a challenge to international politics, and has increasingly received scholarly attention, not least within European Union studies.
The 'governance dilemma' of a globalised world is still pertinent and international organizations continue to lack suitable instruments to monitor and oversee that states fulfil their international obligations.
3 If the agreements of international organizations are not complied with they are of little value. Therefore to inquire into states' compliance with the international agreements they have ratified, is to inquire into the reach, regulatory strength and de facto impact of that international organization. The European Union is a prominent example of how important compliance is to the legitimacy and cohesiveness of an international organization. How to improve compliance and the practical application of EU rules is generally high on the European agenda. Scholarly research on international and regional integration within political science and law has advanced our knowledge considerably during the last decades. A growing number of studies have examined the extent to which EU Member States transpose binding decisions into national law on time and correctly as well as what may explain variation in transposition between the Member States. 4 However we still know relatively little about compliance beyond the transposition of EU law. 5 For example, which instruments improve application of EU rules in practice? What compliance problems arise after transposition of EU law has taken place, i.e. once an EU regulation applies in practice, and how common are these problems? Have new modes of governance developed to handle misapplication on the ground?
The EU constitutes the most legalized international organization in the world, able to judicially address and sanction non-compliance, and is exceedingly effective in doing so compared to other international organizations. 6 However although the importance of management tools to improve compliance has been emphasized in international relations and European studies, 7 scholarly work tends to focus on central and decentralised enforcement mechanisms, i.e. the infringement procedures monitored by the European Commission and private litigants and national courts bringing preliminary references to the European Court of Justice and. 8 We know relatively little about concrete management instruments, how they work, how they have developed and whether they are effective means to improve compliance.
This paper examines the role of transgovernmental networks (TGNs) in monitoring and overseeing the practical application of EU law, focusing on the SOLVIT network.
Transgovernmental networks differ from transnational networks by having government representatives as the actors instead of independent experts or representatives from interest organisations which are main actors transnational networks. 9 The chapter enquires into the modus operandi of TGNs and the effectiveness of this new governance tool as mode of enforcing EU law.
It finds that TGNs have developed as important and effective monitoring instruments for the practical application of EU law, operating mainly in line with management logics. We define effective enforcement as the problem-solving capacity and resolution speed of the network in question. Problem-solving capacity concerns the ability of the network to identify, mediate and solve problems of misapplied EU law. Resolution speed concerns the time used to solve such problems. These dual elements of effective enforcement thus defines effectiveness both in terms of 7 A. Chayes and A.H. Chayes 'On compliance' (1993) Compared to other international organisations, the EU is seen to have developed fairly efficient enforcement procedures through which non-compliance is detected and pursued 11 . As a result, non-compliance is seen by some to be a temporal phenomenon. 12 Concerning the supranational enforcement practices, the vital role played by the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) towards ensuring state compliance stand clear.
13
The role played by interest groups and national courts has also been emphasised as a key 10 E. Versluis 'Even rules, uneven practices: Opening the 'black box' of EU law in action ' (2007) In order to address problems arising in the practical application of EU law, the EU has supplemented its coercive instruments of enforcement with cooperative means of management.
26
Side by side with the deterrent message of enforcement by sanctions, Member States are monitored by means of a more informal, softer managerial approach. This management approach implies dialogue and mutual trust. 27 The management approach recognises that sometimes non-compliance is not the mere result of deliberate behaviour, that is, the member state neglecting or ignoring to fulfil its EU obligations in a calculated manner. Instead, non-compliance can be caused by 24 Börzel, Hofmann, Panke and Sprungk (n 4) 1374. 25 Falkner (n 18) 22.
26 Tallberg (n 6); Tallberg ambiguous treaty language, complex secondary legislation, as well as a lack of administrative capacity and/or transparency. Different solutions are therefore required:
'…the improvement of dispute resolution procedures goes to the problem of ambiguity;
technical and financial assistance may help cure the capacity deficit; and transparency will make it likelier that, over time, national policy decisions are brought increasingly into line with agreed international standards'.
28
The management view introduces an important shift in the EU theoretical and empirical approach to compliance. It departs from a 'command and control' understanding of which instruments best solve problems of the misapplication of law. In order to improve compliance, the non-complier should be assisted to solve the problems -instead of sued and sanctioned. Dispute settlements by means of management are based on dialogue, trust, involvement, capacity building and transparency. 29 Problem solving involves mediation of positions between all the involved parties so that they come to terms with the mutual solution identified. In this way, the process of problem solving aims to find a solution that appeases and works for all the involved parties. The dispute solving mechanisms differ from legal proceedings in court where the court concludes on the 'correct' legal interpretation, which may ultimately please neither parties. Transgovernmental networks constitute such forums for problem-solving, beyond traditional central and decentralized enforcement mechanisms. 28 Chayes and Chayes (n 7).
29 Ch 4 discusses these virtues in relation to transnational agencies as well, and in Ch 3 this would be considered a type of responsive regulation..
Transgovernmental networks as new means of executive governance
Political scientists recognize that transgovernmental networks have emerged as a constitutive part of European integration. 30 Whilst the importance of transgovernmental cooperation has long been accepted within the study of international relations, the scope and the policy areas covered by TGNs with the EU's infrastructure are currently found to have taken on "completely new dimensions".
31
A transgovernmental network consists of regular and purposive relations between government actors, dealing with cross-border policies and problems. The government actors represent the state but operate at levels below the heads of states. They act as sector-specific experts who together develop shared, standard operating practices, by means of regular and purposive action, focusing on sector specific problems such as environmental sustainability, human rights, data protection, electricity, justice and home affairs. 32 Civil servants or 'regulators' are key actors in such networks, serving as the new diplomats of global governance. 33 When they interact with their foreign peers, they bring with them their domestic expertise and views, but are forced to exchange these views and present solutions on collective problems arising from transgovernmentalism in practice.
TGNs serve as fora of sharing information, building capacity, developing experience and learning between the actors involved and thus rely on management, rather than enforcement, 40 Furthermore, the problems arising in practice when internal market law is to be applied essentially mirrors the challenges confronting national authorities, businesses and citizens when practising the rules of global governance.
In order to examine the work-mode and effectiveness of a transgovernmental network,
we conducted an online survey enquiring into the characteristics and modes of the Solvit network.
The survey was sent to all 30 national Solvit centres, i.e. EU-27 as well as Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein as part of the European Economic Area (EEA). 41 The survey was carried out in the first half of 2011. It was presented as solely academic in its purpose. Most of the centres responded to our first enquiry. The centres that did not fill out the survey were subsequently contacted by email and telephone. Over time, all of the centres answered and we thus managed to obtain a full This data is not publicly available but was provided by the Commission on our request on the basis of previously established contact.
The survey themes and questions were put together following close studies of the publicly available documents on Solvit together with explorative interviews with the national centres in the United Kingdom and Denmark. The explorative interviews were used to test our initial theoretical ideas and ensure that the questions would address the key dynamics of the network and appear understandable within its context. 42 The British and Danish Solvit centres also agreed to read through a draft of the survey and provided a final set of comments on our draft.
Finally, we engaged in informal dialogue with the Commission on our project and questionnaire.
We used this approach to ensure as fully as possible that the questions would be intelligible to the network participants. Towards the end of the survey, we also asked the participants if we might return with follow-up questions.
The survey consisted of 30 questions. The centres could mainly respond to them on a scale such as increased/decreased or strongly agree/strongly disagree. We thereby attempted to obtain answers that would be more easily summarised across all participating states. The key questions also included a text box for additional comments. lodged to a 'home' centre; the centre with the same nationality as the complainer. If the home centre deems the case to be within the remit of the network and apparently involving a breach of EU legislation, the dispute is registered in the network and sent to the 'lead' centre. The 'lead' centre is located in the member state where the problem occurred. Should it accept the case, it subsequently initiates dialogue with the national public authority complained about. 49 Within the Commission's internal market Directorate General (DG), a Solvit unit is responsible for supporting the network, for example by assisting with the use of the case management database, engaging in dialogue with the centres on cases and organising events bringing all the actors together. The organisation and work process of the network can be illustrated as follows:
Figure 1: The organisation and work process of the Solvit network. Based on Commission illustration (COM 2011b)
Thus, problem-solving unfolds via several national and cross-national communication and justification processes whereby the application of supranational law is questioned and monitored primarily by national public administrations. The citizen or business needs to present and give reason to the 'home' Solvit centre, which again is to clarify, present and give reason on the disputed matter to the Solvit centre in the other member state: the 'lead' centre. The 'lead' Solvit centre must then present the subject matter and breaches of EU law to the responsible national authority in its own member state. Last, but certainly not least, the responsible national authority must give reason and justify its ways, which again is reviewed and eventually critiqued by the two Solvit centres. As an outcome of the dispute settlement process, the cross-border problem may be solved and misapplication turned into correct application.
Since 2001, Solvit has been institutionalised around a set of main characteristics:
Solvit cases have a 'cross-border' element, such as the sale of goods across internal EU borders or the use of social security by European migrant workers. They relate to practical application and not judicial implementation. A matter must concern a situation in which national legislation is deemed in line with the European obligation but the problem arises in the post-transposition phase.
50
Furthermore, as an alternative to time-consuming and costly legal processes, Solvit aims at speedy redress. A dispute should be solved within a maximum of ten weeks. 51 Moreover, Solvit constitutes a network of informal problem-solving based on recurring dialogues addressing whether supranational law has been misapplied, questioned and monitored. Problems must be solved without legal proceedings. These characteristics make the Solvit network differ from traditional 50 Most Solvit centres also take on so-called 'Solvit+' cases in which changes to the rules behind national implementation appear necessary (COM 2011d). When a Solvit+ case is dealt with, the problem-solving process will also address the institutional cause of misapplication, that is, incorrect judicial implementation. enforcement mechanisms and makes it possible to extend research beyond the conventional focus within compliance studies on timely transposition of EU law.
Becoming a successful dispute settlement mechanism
Over the years, Solvit's workload has increased significantly. 
The effectiveness of transgovernmental networks in dispute settlements and the role of the Commission
From the case-load number itself, it is clear that misapplication cases are brought to Solvit to a considerable extent. Nevertheless, we should still expect -especially from an enforcement perspective -informal dispute resolution to be of limited utility, as national authorities are likely to hinder a dispute mechanism which does not operate by means of 'command and control'. Here we examine effectiveness in accordance with our definition as the resolution speed of the network and the actual ability of the network to resolve cases.
The first proxy for estimating the effectiveness of the network thus concerns the case resolution speed. Is Solvit in practice an expeditious alternative to taking a matter to court? The official aim of the network is to solve cases within ten weeks. Since its establishment, this goal has overall been consistently met. 54 However, the total time taken to process a claim from its submission is somewhat higher. This is due to the 10-week deadline only applies from when a case has been accepted by a lead centre. 55 The home centre's preparation time and the time taken by the lead centre to consider whether to accept the case is therefore not included. In 2010, it took the centres on average five weeks to prepare a case; and one week to consider whether to accept a case from another centre. 56 The total case processing time is therefore roughly 16 weeks, that is, approximately four months. This is still a short period of time compared with other formal enforcement mechanisms, both public and private, and the network stands out as efficient in terms of prompt dispute resolution.
The second proxy for effectiveness is the ability of the network to resolve cases. Here, the Commission's statistics again provide a picture of a highly successful system. 57 The official aim of the network is a resolution rate of 80 per cent. This target has generally been achieved from 2002 onwards, although with some differences between the Member States. But what does it mean that a case is resolved? In its 2010 Annual Report, the Commission notes that in practice 'resolved' can, mean two different things: a changed decision or a clarification. 58 The former entails that the initial administrative act is altered following the intervention of Solvit, namely that misapplication is transformed into correct application. The latter means that the claimant ultimately only receives 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid.
56 European Commission (n 47).
57 European Commission (n 39).
additional information clarifying the background and reasons behind the decision, but the decision is not changed. Both outcomes are important as to how national administrations adapt to EU governance in the sense that they engage national public authorities and claimants in a mode of reasoning structured in EU legal terms. 59 However, when the dispute is settled by means of a changed decision, this most directly substantiates the effectiveness and impact of the network, as it demonstrates the ability of the network to improve practical application.
The Commission states that 23 per cent of all cases in 2010 ended with a clarification, meaning that the rest of the cases solved led to altered decisions. 60 This suggests that the network is in fact able to generate alterations to decisions, that is, altering administrative acts. …unfortunately we do not feel support for SOLVIT cases from our superiors, especially for citizen cases [.] The survey data thus highlight the importance of good working relations, legal analysis and to a large extent also ministerial backing. On the other hand, overall, the centres do not find the extent to which an issue is politicised of high importance.
All in all, the official data presented by the Commission suggests that the network is an efficient problem-solving mechanism. Resolution speed is high compared to, for example, legal proceedings or formal infringement proceedings instigated by the Commission. Efficiency is also supported by the survey data collected for this analysis. Decentralised informal problem solving is, in fact, able to address gaps between the transposition and practical application of EU legislation.
We do see some differences in outcomes in that the end result may amount to a change in a decision or solely a clarification. However, the vast majority of Solvit cases lead to a change in the original decisions and even in clarification cases, the work of the network promotes and strengthens the use of arguments framed in EU legal terms within national public authorities to justify the action they have taken. Thus, the Commission plays a central role in assisting and advising on dispute settlements.
Although the process of resolution appears horizontally organized between three entities, namely the individual or firm with a complaint, the relevant Solvit centres and the national public authority against which a complaint has been made, the Commission (vertically) shadows the dispute and masters the database, assists on the clarification of EU law, and has a final say when conflicts thus contributed to fill in the black hole of developing a better understanding of EU law in action.
Transgovernmental networks are effectively located in the core executives of the Member States, but reporting back to and taking advice from the Commission. 64 The Commission has quietly and discreetly rearmed in its battle against misapplication of EU law relating to the functioning of the internal market by Member States by focusing on compliance problems in the post-transposition stage. Alternative dispute settlement networks have developed and proven considerably effective as a mechanism of de-centralized management practices ensuring EU compliance. The informal dispute resolution provided by a TGN such as Solvit provides a strong, supplementary means of enforcing EU law along with the two traditional public and private enforcement mechanisms .
Whilst national courts are de-centralized private enforcement mechanisms, 65 a transgovernmental network constitutes a de-centralized management mechanism which may be remarkably effective and successful in solving problems of misapplication.
In part, this success is explained by the fact that national public authorities become supervisors of national compliance while operating close to the units under 'surveillance'. The national Solvit centres are part of the national executives, located and financed there. At the same time, however, they are responsible for overseeing the conduct of their national counterparts; to question it, evaluate it, report on it and -eventually -take steps to ensure that it is in accordance with EU legislation. In this way, they become entrusted supervisors of EU laws and key institutions in managing practical application, but in contrast to the national courts, do so in a manner more informed by trust, less by the threat of sanctions. They thus constitute an important part of the 'European executive space', monitoring EU law but located in the national administrations.
Although horizontal in structure and operating by means of management, the transgovernmental Solvit network has an important vertical dimension. The Commission occupies a central role in assisting and advising dispute settlements. The Commission's involvement implies that, should the softer means of management not work, enforcement proceedings may be initiated. The continuous presence of the Commission means that supranational hierarchy shadows dispute resolution. In the shadow of supranational hierarchy, informal dispute settlements stand out as the attractive alternative. By creating a transgovernmental network of de-centralised supervision through national public authorities, the Commission has taken another important step in boosting the enforcementmanagement machinery of the EU 67 , capable of detecting and resolving some of the disputes over the practical application of EU rule 'below the tip of the non-compliance iceberg'. 68 67 Tallberg (n 13). 68 Börzel (n 62).
